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The Opioid Litigation:
The FDA is MIA
Catherine M. Sharkey*
ABSTRACT
It is readily agreed that federal preemption of state tort law
alters the balance between federal and state power.  Federal pre-
emption is a high-profile defense in almost all modern products
liability cases.  It is thus surprising to see how little attention has
been given to federal preemption by courts and commentators in
the opioid litigation.  Opioid litigation provides a lens through
which I explore the role of state and federal courts and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in striking the right balance of
power.  My purpose here is not to resolve the divide among the
few courts that have weighed in on the preemption defense in the
opioid cases before them; instead, it is to highlight the appropri-
ate inquiry in which the courts should engage.  Namely courts
should scrutinize the regulatory actions taken by the FDA and
evaluate the extent to which state tort law actions fall within or
outside of the bounds of the risk analysis already undertaken by
the FDA.  Such an analysis would put pressure on the FDA to
weigh in—either on its own or as invited by the courts—on the
balance between its regulatory actions and the need for state tort
law causes of action.  The courts would then scrutinize input from
the agency under “hard look” review.  No longer could the FDA
remain on the sidelines, as it has to date, amidst a public health
crisis that is now playing out in the courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency.1  In that
same year, what had hitherto been a trickle of government lawsuits
against opioid drug manufacturers, distributors, and retailers be-
came a flood, as more than one hundred states, counties, and cities
filed claims.  In December 2017, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) transferred more than one hundred
government claims against opioid drug manufacturers, distributors,
sellers, and prescribers to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio.2  State attorneys general filed additional suits in
state courts.
The lawsuits allege various state law causes of action, including
that the drug manufacturers improperly marketed or over-pro-
moted opioids for long-term use to treat chronic pain; that they
minimized the risks of addiction; that they encouraged excessive
prescribing that created a larger supply for potential diversion; and
that they created a “public nuisance” by taking these actions.3
Whether litigation is an appropriate response to the opioid epi-
1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Acting Secretary
Declares Public Health Emergency to Address National Opioid Crisis (Oct. 26,
2017), https://bit.ly/2yj7n0g [https://perma.cc/9YPH-Q5JZ].
2. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1380 (J.P.M.L.
2017).
3. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. MDL 2804, 2018 WL
4895856, at *34 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2018) (Magistrate’s report and
recommendation).
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demic has been forcibly debated;4 less attention has been given to
the propriety of the specific state law causes of action involved—
namely over-promotion, risk of diversion, or public nuisance.
Curiously, the role of the federal Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) has not been front and center—in either the public de-
bate or, more surprisingly, in the high-profile litigation.  In this
Article, I highlight the significance of the FDA’s regulatory process
for the approval and labeling of opioids—specifically for long-term
use against chronic pain—and the role this process plays in opioid
litigation.  The defense of federal preemption of state tort law
claims for FDA-approved drugs (and medical devices) is featured
prominently in products liability litigation against drug (and medi-
cal device) manufacturers—but it has gained little traction in the
opioid cases in state and federal courts.  Those eager to see drug
manufacturers, distributors, and sellers held responsible and ac-
countable might applaud this state of affairs.  But, as I will argue in
this Article, the courts’ lack of engagement with the federal pre-
emption defense comes at a cost—namely a missed opportunity for
the courts (and thereby the public) to interrogate the regulatory
role and accountability of the FDA.
My purpose here is not to resolve the divide in the few courts
that have weighed in on the preemption defense in the opioid cases
before them.  Instead, the goal of this Article is to highlight the
appropriate inquiry in which the courts should engage.  I argue that
courts should scrutinize the regulatory actions taken by the FDA
and evaluate the extent to which state tort law actions fall within or
outside of the bounds of the risk analysis already undertaken by the
FDA.  This analysis would put pressure on the FDA to weigh in on
the balance between its regulatory actions and the need for state
tort law causes of action.  Courts, scrutinizing input from the FDA
under “hard look” review, could ensure that the agency does not
remain on the sidelines, and that it acknowledges the role it has and
will continue to play in the opioid epidemic.
I. OPIOID REGULATION: THE FDA’S ACTIVE ROLE
The FDA has been actively involved in the regulation of
opioids.  As Lars Noah reminds us, “[f]ederal agencies represent
the first . . . line of defense against the misuse of pain management
4. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic:
The Role of Courts in a National Health Crisis, 46 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 351
(2018); Derek Carr, Corey S. Davis & Lainie Rutkow, Reducing Harm Through
Litigation Against Opioid Manufacturers? Lessons from The Tobacco Wars, 133
PUB. HEALTH REP. 207 (2018).
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technologies.”5  Opioids are pharmaceutical drugs that must be ap-
proved by the FDA as safe and effective and are available only by
prescription.  The pre-market new drug approval (“NDA”) process
for brand-name Class III drugs is a rigorous and lengthy safety re-
view process, predicated on the drug manufacturer submitting three
phases of clinical trial evidence.6  The FDA faces the classic trade-
off between Type I errors (false positive)—approving drugs that
turn out not to be safe and effective—and Type II errors (false neg-
ative)—withholding approval from drugs that are in fact safe and
effective.  The FDA has a reputation for being risk averse and tend-
ing towards minimizing Type I errors, by maintaining very stringent
ex ante review criteria.  In the contexts of opioids, the FDA must
navigate this choice, balancing the potential societal harms of dan-
gerous drugs such as opioids against the needs of patients in chronic
pain.
The FDA approved the opioid drug OxyContin in 1995.7  Ox-
ycontin uses a time-release formula designed to offer sustained re-
lief over a 12-hour period to patients with chronic moderate-to-
severe pain.8  Manufacturers Purdue Pharma and Abbott Labs pro-
moted their drug as presenting a lower risk of abuse and diversion,
given that the time-release version would not provide a quick eu-
phoric effect upon initial ingestion.  But the companies failed to an-
ticipate that drug abusers, to defeat the slow-release feature, could
chew, crush, dissolve, or scrape the coating off the tablets, thus
leaving stronger doses of oxycodone than those found in individual
Percocet or Percodan tablets.  They could then ingest, snort, or in-
ject the substance.  Reports indicate that hundreds (if not
thousands) of people have died after overdosing in this fashion, typ-
ically as a result of acute pulmonary edema.9
In addition to approving high-risk drugs as safe and effective,
the FDA also carefully controls the information and warnings pro-
vided by the manufacturer during the FDA’s labeling pre-approval
process.  Moreover, the FDA conducts post-market oversight.  In
5. Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Tech-
nologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 64 (2003).
6. FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://bit.ly/2w3qN8N [https://perma.cc/5KVW-XKAJ].
7. Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing
Opioid Misuse and Abuse, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://bit.ly/2xGQBrv
[https://perma.cc/87XG-WT7T].
8. “In contrast, the older drug products in this class (including the related
hydrocodone drugs such as Vicodin and Lortab) may offer uneven relief over just a
3[–]4[-]hour period.”  Noah, supra note 5, at 62.
9. Id. at 62.
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July 2001, the FDA mandated labeling revisions for OxyContin to
provide stronger warnings.  A few months later, the FDA convened
one of its advisory committees to provide additional
recommendations.10
In what follows, I canvas the significant regulatory actions
taken by the FDA in the post-market surveillance period.  It is
worth emphasizing at the outset that this account does not re-
present the full regulatory record but is instead gleaned from the
bits and pieces of the FDA administrative record that surfaced in
opioid litigations, including in parties’ briefs to the courts and
courts’ motions, orders, and decisions.
A. FDA Denial of Citizen Petitions Requesting Labeling
Changes
FDA regulations provide stakeholders with the opportunity to
file a “citizen petition” to request the agency to “take or refrain
from taking”11 an administrative action, such as labeling changes to
FDA-approved drugs.
In January 2004, the Connecticut Attorney General submitted
a citizen petition requesting a labeling change for OxyContin.  The
petition claimed that OxyContin was not a true 12-hour drug and
that its use on a more frequent dosing schedule increased its risk for
diversion and abuse.  In September 2008, the FDA denied the peti-
tion, concluding the evidence failed to support that using OxyCon-
tin more frequently than every 12 hours posed greater risks.12
In July 2012, a coalition of concerned doctors, Physicians for
Responsible Opioid Prescribing (“PROP”), filed a citizen petition
requesting the FDA to alter its indicated uses for opioids.  PROP
stated that clinicians were under the false impression that chronic
opioid therapy was an evidence-based treatment for chronic non-
cancer pain and asked the FDA to prohibit manufacturers from
marketing opioids for conditions for which the use of opioids had
not been proven safe and effective.13
10. Id. at 63.
11. Initiation of administrative proceedings, 21 C.F.R. § 10.25 (1989); Citizen
petition, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2016).
12. Letter from Janet Woodcock, MD., Dir., Ctr. for Drug Eval. and Re-
search, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Richard Blumenthal, Conn. Attorney Gen.
(Sept. 9, 2008), https://bit.ly/35ahG30 [https://perma.cc/RK9S-DR9Y] [hereinafter
2008 Woodcock Letter].
13. See Letter from Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing to the U.S.
Food and Drug Admin. (July 25, 2012) (on file with the American Society of Anes-
thesiologists); Letter from Janet Woodcock, MD., Dir., Ctr. for Drug Eval. and
Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to Andrew Kolodny, President, Physicians
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In 2013, the FDA responded to the petition, granting it in part
and rejecting it in part.  Recognizing the grave risks associated with
opioid use, the FDA required opioid manufacturers to include in
their drug labels a warning that opioids should be used only when
alternative treatments were inadequate.  The FDA declined to rec-
ommend a daily maximum dose or the maximum duration of opioid
treatment and stated that more controlled studies were needed con-
cerning the long-term use of opioids.  The agency acknowledged
that high rates of addiction were concerning and ordered opioid
manufacturers to conduct post-approval studies on the long-term
use of the medications.14
B. FDA Approval of Specific Requirements for Extended-Release
Opioids
On July 9, 2012, the FDA approved a Risk Evaluation and Mit-
igation Strategy (“REMS”) for extended release, long-action
opioids.15  The REMS directs physicians to “[u]nderstand and ap-
propriately use screening tools for addiction or abuse to help assess
potential risks associated with chronic opioid therapy and to help
manage patients using ER/LA [extended release and long-acting]
opioid analgesics.”16  The REMS contains requirements for distri-
bution of a Medication Guide with each prescription filled, as well
as a requirement that training be made available to all those who
prescribe ER/LA opioids.  It further specifies the necessary ele-
ments of prescriber training in the “FDA Blueprint for Prescriber
Education for Extended-Release and Long-Acting Opioid
Analgesics” (“FDA Blueprint”).  The FDA Blueprint provides
prescribers with guidance to enable appropriate ER/LA opioid pre-
scribing practices and information to use when counseling patients
about the risks and benefits of ER/LA opioid use.17
C. FDA Informal Communications
In May 2019, a medical officer in the FDA Division of Anes-
thesia, Analgesia, and Addiction Products wrote a letter entitled
“Opioids Regulatory Background for the June 11–12, 2018,
for Responsible Opioid Prescribing (Sept. 10, 2013) https://bit.ly/3bP2MkS [https://
perma.cc/RK2J-HTAH] [hereinafter 2013 Woodcock Letter].
14. See 2013 Woodcock Letter, supra note 13, at 11–12.
15. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXTENDED-RELEASE (ER) AND LONG-ACT-
ING (LA) OPIOID ANALGESICS RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY
(REMS) (2012), http://bit.ly/2UwjlLG [https://perma.cc/797J-AF4G].
16. Id. at 3.
17. See 2013 Woodcock Letter, supra note 13, at 4.
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DSaRM [Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Commit-
tee]/AADPAC [Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug Products Advisory
Committee] Meeting.”18  This letter was not part of official corre-
spondence by the FDA, but it was cited by defendants to support
the proposition that the FDA disagreed with labeling changes that
plaintiffs claim were necessary.19
Beyond discussing some of the background health effects asso-
ciated with opioid use, the defendants argued that the letter rein-
forced the FDA’s position against setting maximum daily doses for
prescription opioids—a major issue in the 2012 PROP citizen peti-
tion.  The FDA noted that “no particular dose of any opioid has
been determined to be a cutoff point between safe-for-use or un-
safe-for-use.”20  In support, the letter cited the findings of the Pain
Management Best Practices Inter-Agency Task Force, created as a
part of the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016,
which declined to recommend “any absolute limits on the individ-
ual dose or total daily dose of opioid analgesics.”21
Moreover, the FDA letter also casts sharp doubt on what it
termed “well-meaning attempts to address the opioid crisis without
adequate scientific evidence to support such actions.”22  In particu-
lar, the letter pointed to the inappropriate use of a 2016 Center for
Disease Control (CDC) Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for
Chronic Pain to support the idea that opioids should be subject to a
maximum daily dose.  The misinterpretation and misapplication of
these guidelines, the letter maintained, “contribut[ed] to substantial
harms to patients, particularly patients with chronic pain, who were
forced to taper their previously stable opioid doses to lower doses,
or who were forced to discontinue their opioids through forced ta-
pers or patient abandonment.”23  These harms include suicidal idea-
tion, suicidal self-directed violence, severe withdrawal accompanied
by worsening pain and profound loss of function, and the increased
18. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM FROM NING HU, MED. OF-
FICER, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (May 13, 2019), https://
bit.ly/3eWme1C [https://perma.cc/6HE3-ECAA] [hereinafter HU MEMO].
19. Manufacturer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiffs’
State-Law Claims are Preempted and Their Federal Claims are Precluded at 13, In
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17 MD 2804 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2019).
20. HU MEMO, supra note 18, at 10.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 11.  The letter further noted that the extent of the misuse of the 2016
CDC Guidance was substantial enough to cause the agency to release a statement
in 2019 titled “CDC Advises Against Misapplication of the [2016] Guideline for
Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain.” Id.
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chance patients may seek relief from dangerous and illicit sources
of opioids.24
In contrast to maximum daily doses or other rigid guidelines,
the letter emphasized the Inter-Agency Task Force’s conclusion
that “emphasis should be placed on the importance of individual-
ized care, the use of multimodal approaches to acute pain manage-
ment, and the use of multidisciplinary approaches to chronic pain
management,” consistent with the facets of the FDA Blueprint that
focused on patient/provider counseling.25  Interestingly, the letter
suggested it was “the over reliance on the use of prescription opioid
analgesics,” and the associated societal harms that have led to in-
tense scrutiny of opioids, rather than defective labeling or design.26
Indeed, nowhere did the letter make any reference to controversy
over changes to opioid labeling practices beyond a tame observa-
tion that “[t]he product labeling contains a summary of the essential
scientific information needed for the safe and effective use of the
drug.”27
II. OPIOID LITIGATION: SPOTLIGHT ON THE FDA
Federal preemption is a high-profile defense in almost all mod-
ern products liability cases.  It is thus surprising to see how little
attention has been given to federal preemption by courts and com-
mentators in the opioid litigation.  The relative inattention cannot
be explained by a lack of vigor for federal preemption on the part
of defendant manufacturers.  Indeed, as explored in Section A, de-
fendants have consistently raised the preemption defense in each of
the litigated cases.  Moreover, the few courts that have wrestled
with the preemption defense have found it to be a difficult, close
issue.
But there remains substantive uncertainty regarding the appro-
priate inquiry or factors that should guide courts’ preemption deter-
minations.  As I shall argue, a significant lacuna is input from the
FDA.  This is so both in terms of providing the full regulatory re-
cord documenting the agency’s decades-long back-and-forth with
opioid drug manufacturers, as well as clarifying the agency’s posi-
tion on whether the state law claims would upend its regulatory di-
rectives and aims.  Thus far, no court has called for the views of the
FDA, nor has the FDA intervened on its own accord.  In Section B,
I apply the “agency reference model” for preemption and attempt
24. Id. at 10.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Id. at 13.
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to map out the significant questions that must be addressed by
courts.
A. In Search of the Federal Preemption Defense
The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth different standards that
govern federal preemption of state law claims against brand-name
drug manufacturers and of those claims brought against generic
drug manufacturers.  State law failure-to-warn claims against
brand-name manufacturers are only preempted where the manufac-
turer provides “clear evidence” that the FDA would have rejected
the proposed labeling changes.28  State law failure-to-warn and de-
sign defect claims against generic drug manufacturers are pre-
empted, in light of the fact that generic (unlike brand-name) drug
manufacturers cannot unilaterally change their labels; instead, they
must abide by federal “sameness” directives, requiring their labels
and warnings to match those of their brand-name equivalents.29
Numerous courts have concluded that state law claims involv-
ing an FDA-approved prescription brand-name drug are preempted
when a plaintiff alleges one of two scenarios: (1) a defendant unlaw-
fully included misleading information or (2) a defendant failed to
include important warnings on the drug’s label, where the defen-
dant could unilaterally alter the label and/or there is “clear evi-
dence” the FDA would not approve a change to the label if sought
by the defendant.30  Preemption determinations in claims against
generic manufacturers are even more likely in light of the “same-
ness” directives that bar any action to alter the drug’s label that
differs from action already taken by brand-name equivalents.  Fed-
eral preemption challenges persist in drug litigation with parties’
attempts to push the boundaries of the framework set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
1. Opioid Manufacturers’ Vigorous Preemption Arguments
Defendants in opioid litigation have moved to dismiss (or for
summary judgment on) plaintiffs’ state law misrepresentation
claims on the basis of federal preemption.31  The thrust of the pre-
28. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 571 (2009).
29. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 624 (2011).
30. See, e.g., Dolin v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 901 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir.
2018); Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 855 F.3d 1091, 1099 (10th Cir. 2017).
31. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Manufacturer Defendants’ Joint
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., No. 1:17 MD 2804 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2018) [hereinafter Motion to
Dismiss]; Manufacturer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment that Plain-
tiffs’ State-Law Claims are Preempted and Their Federal Claims are Precluded, In
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emption argument is that the FDA’s various decisions regarding the
risks and medically appropriate uses of opioids conflict with the al-
legations raised in the state law claims.32  Put another way, state law
claims are preempted where they would require the opioid manu-
facturer to make statements about the safety or efficacy of the drug
in its marketing materials that differ from those required by the
FDA.
Defendants’ arguments are twofold: First, state claims are pre-
empted because they seek to impose liability for lawful promotion
of an FDA-approved product for an FDA-approved use.  Second,
state law claims are preempted because the FDA has previously de-
clined to alter the labeling and/or warnings.
Starting with the first set of arguments, opioid defendants
claim that their marketing and promotion of opioid medications is
entirely consistent with the FDA’s approval of their respective
drug, including its indication for chronic pain, as well as duration of
use and daily dosage.33  For example, the FDA approved long-term
use of a twice daily dose of Purdue’s OxyContin to treat chronic
pain.  More controversially, the defendants also justify their use and
promotion of the concept of “pseudoaddiction”—a drug-seeking
behavior that mimics addiction from patients receiving inadequate
pain relief—on the ground the FDA-approved labeling likewise
embodied this concept.34  Opioid defendants also assert doctors are
able to use addiction risk-screening tools to identify and safely pre-
scribe opioids to patients, even those predisposed to addiction, by
pointing to the FDA-mandated REMS that requires drug manufac-
turers to provide risk-benefit information to physicians.35  And fi-
nally, they tout the effectiveness of abuse-deterrent opioid
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17 MD 2804 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2019)
[hereinafter Motion for Summary Judgment].
32. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 31, at 34; Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, supra note 31, at 4.
33. State v. Purdue Pharma Inc., No. 217-2017-CV-00402, 2018 WL 4566129,
at *2–4 (N.H. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2018) (arguing, on its own behalf, that Purdue is
entitled to dismissal because “each of the . . . alleged misrepresentations the State
has identified involves statements or conduct that are consistent with the FDA-
approved labeling for its medications or with other regulatory decisions of the
FDA”); Grewal v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. ESX-C-245-17, 2018 WL 4829660, at
*5–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Oct. 02, 2018) (arguing likewise).
34. See, e.g., Defendants Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., and the
Purdue Frederick Company Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
and Memorandum of Law in Support at 11, State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma
L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Sept. 22, 2017) [hereinafter OK Motion to
Dismiss].
35. North Dakota v. Purdue Pharma, LP, et al., No. 08-2018-CV-01300, slip
op. at 12 (N.D. Dist. Ct. May 10, 2019) (granting motion to dismiss).
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formulations to prevent abuse and addiction, consistent with the
FDA-approved labeling that indicates that the ingredients are in-
tended to make the tablet more difficult to misuse and abuse.36
But a manufacturer of an FDA-approved brand-name drug
cannot wield federal preemption to immunize itself against state
law failure-to-warn claims solely on the basis that the FDA ap-
proved the drug and its accompanying labeling.  Rather, as the U.S.
Supreme Court made clear in Wyeth v. Levine,37 the manufacturer
remains responsible for its labeling (which includes all marketing
materials) at all times.38  Moreover, should new risk evidence come
to light, the manufacturer is empowered by federal regulation to
add information or warnings to its FDA-approved label while si-
multaneously informing the FDA.39  In other words, the manufac-
turer cannot claim immunity from state law claims on the basis that
it could not add to the information in the FDA-approved label
without seeking prior FDA approval.  Only where the manufacturer
provides “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved
the additional information or warnings is the state law failure-to-
warn claim preempted.40  And in Merck Sharpe & Dohme, Inc. v.
Albrecht,41 the Court clarified that the “clear evidence” standard
was one for the court (not jury) to decide.42  The Court also elabo-
rated on the substance of the “clear evidence” standard, stating that
“in a case like Wyeth,” impossibility preemption requires the “man-
ufacturer to show that it fully informed the FDA of the justifica-
tions for the warning required by state law and that the FDA, in
turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not ap-
prove changing the drug’s label to include that warning.”43
Accordingly, the opioid defendants advance the second set of
arguments, maintaining that they have met the Wyeth “clear evi-
dence” standard.  They point first and foremost to the FDA’s rejec-
tion of the 2012 PROP citizen petition, which among other things
36. Id. at 13.
37. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
38. Id. at 570–71 (2009); see also id. at 608 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing 21
C.F.R § 314.80; 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)).
39. Id. at 568 (describing the “changes being affected” regulation, which al-
lows the manufacturer to change the label to “add or strengthen a contraindica-
tion, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction” or to “add or strengthen an
instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to increase the safe
use of the drug product” upon filing a supplemental application with the FDA)
(citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)).
40. Id. at 571.
41. Merck Sharpe & Dohme, Inc. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
42. Id. at 1672.
43. Id. at 1678.
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sought to limit the use of opioids in non-cancer patients to 90 days,
as “clear evidence” the FDA would have rejected labeling changes
concerning the long-term use of opioids, the concept of pseudoad-
diction, and addiction withdrawal.44  In its response to the PROP
petition, the FDA concluded that the available information did not
demonstrate a causal relationship between dosage and adverse
events.45  Moreover, as the defendants argue, the “FDA did so
based on its comprehensive review of the available scientific infor-
mation on the benefits and risks of ER/LA opioids and with its ex-
press acknowledgment of the limitations in the available data on
long-term use.”46
Finally, the defendants note that the FDA mandated further
studies to provide an empirical foundation for any labeling revi-
sions to provide different or additional information regarding risks
and benefits to physicians: “As to certain risks that were already
included in the labeling for the medications, FDA required manu-
facturers of ER/LA opioids to conduct additional studies and fur-
ther assess those risks along with the benefits of use, and those
studies are underway.”47  But, according to the defendants, “[u]ntil
such evidence is available or [the] FDA requires labeling changes,
state law claims that would force [opioid manufacturers] to make
statements that are inconsistent with the labeling [the] FDA has re-
quired would conflict directly with its federal law obligations.”48
2. A Puzzle in the Courts: Avoidance and Partial Responses
Federal preemption is typically front and center in modern
products liability litigation, especially concerning pharmaceuticals
and medical devices.  The relative inattention given to federal pre-
emption in the opioid litigation is thus, at least at first glance,
puzzling.
In the Oklahoma litigation brought by the Attorney General
against Purdue, for example, the state court’s final decision did not
mention preemption at all.49  In a prior order, the court summarily
44. In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017, 2018 WL 3115102, at *9 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 18, 2018).  In addition, the FDA rejected the 2004 petition from the Attor-
ney General of Connecticut, which claimed that OxyContin was not a twelve-hour
drug and should be dosed more frequently. See 2008 Woodcock Letter, supra note
12, at 1.
45. See 2013 Woodcock Letter, supra note 13, at 16–17.
46. OK Motion to Dismiss, supra note 34, at 6.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id.
49. See generally State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-
816, 2019 WL 4019929 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019).
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rejected preemption without any explanation: “After review of the
briefs and oral arguments from the parties, the [c]ourt finds and
orders that the State’s Petition sufficiently states its claims[,] and
those claims should not be dismissed based on preemption or pur-
suant to the Primary Jurisdiction doctrine or the Court’s inherent
power.”50  In a similar fashion, a Delaware state court dispensed
with the manufacturers’ preemption arguments with a single line:
“The State’s allegations of labeling inconsistent with FDA approv-
als (‘pseudoaddiction,’ softening and minimization) are sufficient to
survive dismissal on the grounds of federal preemption.”51
One explanation is that plaintiffs have strategically framed
their causes of action so as to avoid federal preemption, and courts
have narrowly construed the domain of federal preemption to apply
to failure-to-warn (and design defect) product liability claims.  In
other words, where courts have addressed the federal preemption
defense, the brevity of their discussion is a function of their finding
that the bulk of claims fall outside the scope of the preemption de-
fense.  One such category of claims is fraud.  Thus, as an Ohio state
court explained, “[T]he allegations of the Plaintiff’s complaint pri-
marily sound in fraud and not the propriety of the labeling of
opioids. . . . [D]rug labeling does not preclude fraud claims.  The
claims set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint are not barred by the FDA’s
approval of labeling or the doctrine of preemption as to Defend-
ants’ branded or unbranded labeling.”52
A second, related, category of cases implicates aggressive off-
label promotion amounting to misrepresentations by the drug man-
ufacturer.  For example, the State of New Hampshire brought an
action in state court alleging that “‘Purdue aggressively marketed
its opioids for long-term use to treat chronic pain through misrepre-
sentations that were intended to lead doctors to prescribe the drugs
even in circumstances where they were inappropriate, i.e., to disre-
gard cautions that the FDA itself has recognized as appropriate and
necessary.’”53  In other words, according to the State, “‘Purdue
50. State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma. L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2017 WL
10152334, at *1 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Dec. 6, 2017) (order denying motion to dismiss).
51. State ex rel. Jennings v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. N18C-01-223 MMJ
CCLD, 2019 WL 446382, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2019).
52. State ex rel. DeWine v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 17 CI 261, 2018 WL
4080052, at *3 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 22, 2018).  As the court further explained:
“The parties agree that the FDA approved the labeling for opioids for long-term
treatment.  However, it is evident in the Plaintiff’s complaint that its claims are
based upon misrepresentations made by the Defendants concerning the use and
safety of opioids which go far beyond the labeling.” Id.
53. State v. Purdue Pharma Inc., No. 217-2017-CV-00402, 2018 WL 4566129,
at *3 (N.H. Super. Ct. Sep. 18, 2018) (citation omitted).
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marketed opioids in a manner that is contrary to, inconsistent with,
or outside of their FDA-approved labels.’”54  Such allegations, the
court reasoned, “‘do[ ] not seek a change to the FDA-approved la-
beling of Purdue’s drugs.’”55  The court concluded that Purdue
failed to show that the state’s allegations wholly reflect conduct that
was consistent with the FDA-approved labeling and thus rejected
Purdue’s preemption defense.56
Along similar lines, courts have been persuaded that preemp-
tion defenses do not pertain to causes of action that focus on the
drug manufacturer’s business practices as distinct from labeling
choices.  For example, in the New York state case, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the manufacturer defendants made presentations to med-
ical professionals and others about the efficacies of long-term use of
opioids as though those statements were supported by substantial
evidence.  Further, plaintiffs contended “that the manufacturer de-
fendants knew about the addictive effects of opioids . . . but mini-
mized those effects when promoting, marketing, and advertising the
drugs.”57  The New York state court held that these allegations,
which “are not based upon the same theories and scientific evi-
dence presented in the PROP petition,” instead concern the de-
fendants’ business practices and were therefore not preempted.58
In a similar vein, the Ohio federal Multidistrict Litigation
(MDL) court declined to read the plaintiffs’ allegations as “pre-
mised upon inappropriate labeling or a fraud on the FDA” and in-
stead interpreted the state law claims as “fraudulent marketing in
54. Id.
55. Id. The court concluded that Purdue’s statements that
OxyContin’s abuse-deterrent properties “prevent tampering,” result in a
drug that “cannot be crushed or snorted,” and in practice “prevent or re-
duce opioid abuse” may reasonably be read as attributing more signifi-
cance to the abuse-deterrent properties than the FDA intended when it
seemingly found the abuse-deterrent properties merely make the drug
somewhat “more difficult to manipulate.”
Id. at *4.
56. Id.
57. In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017, 2018 WL 3115102, at *9 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 18, 2018).
For example, the plaintiffs allege[d] that the manufacturer defendants
used the concept of pseudoaddiction as an excuse to encourage medical
professionals to prescribe more or higher doses of opioids despite knowl-
edge of the high risk of abuse.  The manufacturer defendants allegedly
distributed treatment guidelines to professionals, which indicated that a
clinician’s first response to treating pseudoaddiction was to increase dos-
ing although other adequate treatment options were available.
Id.
58. Id.
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the promotion and sale of their opioids.”59  The court moreover
held that a state law duty to monitor the sale of opioids with due
care was not inherently “inconsistent with the purposes of the
FDCA[ ] and thus not preempted.”60
Interestingly, courts have followed this line of reasoning even
in the context of generic drug preemption, notwithstanding the fact
that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence strongly favors preemption
of claims against generic manufacturers.  For example, a Rhode Is-
land state court sharply distinguished prior U.S. Supreme Court
cases involving “claims of products liability, including failure-to-
warn and design defect” from the “common-law claims such as neg-
ligence and public nuisance” before it.61  Echoing some of its sister
state jurisdictions that refused to preempt off-label promotion
claims against brand-name manufacturers, the court held that
“[w]hile [generic] pharmaceutical manufacturers are required to
comply with FDA regulations with respect to labeling, they are
under no obligation to engage in off-label promotion.”62  Thus, the
court rejected the argument that the State’s claims against a generic
drug manufacturer based on misleading or fraudulent marketing
were preempted.63
The Ohio federal MDL court similarly extended its reasoning
from the brand-name drug context to generic drugs.  In addressing
generic manufacturers’ preemption arguments, the court
agreed only with the narrow argument that liability could not be
“impose[d] upon the Generic Manufacturers . . . for not sending
warnings that the Brand-Name Manufacturers had not sent,” . . .
59. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17 MD 2804, 2019 WL
4178591, *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2019) (order denying defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment).  This order by Judge Polster responded to four separate summary
judgment motions by various groupings of defendants (Non-RICO Small Distribu-
tors, Pharmacies and Distributors, Manufacturers, and Generic Manufacturers).
Id. at *1.  The order summarized the findings and conclusions of three separate
magistrate Report and Recommendations and issued a final order regarding pre-
emption, holding that the state law claims are not preempted and denying sum-
mary judgment. Id. at *12.
60. Id. at *2 (internal citation omitted).  The court also observed that “plain-
tiffs were not seeking to enforce the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (‘FDCA’), but their allegations were ‘of the type that would tradi-
tionally be brought as state law claims [prior to the enactment of the FDCA].’” Id.
(internal citation omitted).  Otherwise, their claims would be preempted. See
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).
61. State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. PC-2018-4555, 2019 R.I. Super. LEXIS
95, at *60 (Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2019).
62. Id.
63. Id. at *61.
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“because it would be impossible for Generic Manufacturers to
comply with both federal law and the supposed state law duty.”64
However, the court continued, to the extent that the state law
claims are based on other theories—like “aggressive and misleading
marketing and inadequate anti-diversion activities”—they were not
preempted.65
Not all courts, however, make such a sharp distinction between
preempted products liability claims and non-preempted marketing
and off-label promotion claims.  For example, in State ex rel.
Stenehjem v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,66 the state of North Dakota stra-
tegically avoided raising an inadequate warning theory; instead it
raised claims for violations of state consumer fraud law, uncon-
scionable business practices, and statutory public nuisance.  Even
though the State studiously avoided raising an inadequate labeling
theory, the court nonetheless observed that the State did argue that
Purdue could have and should have strengthened its labeling and
warnings to include additional risks without prior FDA approval.67
The court concluded that the allegedly improper marketing prac-
tices were consistent with FDA’s product label; thus the claims
were preempted under conventional drug preemption analysis.68
Finally, after Wyeth and Albrecht, the courts face lingering doc-
trinal uncertainty regarding what constitutes “clear evidence” the
FDA would not have approved a particular warning or new infor-
mation to a brand-name drug label.  Some courts have accepted the
argument that a response to a citizen petition can constitute such
evidence.  For example, having subjected the State’s claims to pre-
emption analysis, the North Dakota state court held that there was
sufficiently “clear evidence” the FDA would not have changed the
label on the basis of the agency’s rejection of the PROP citizen peti-
64. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2019 WL 4178591, at *6 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 3, 2019).
65. Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Nat’l Prescrip-
tion Opiate Litig., No. 1:17 MD 2804, 2019 WL 2468267, at *22 (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 1,
2019), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, No. 1:17 MD
02804, 2019 WL 3737023 (N.D. Ohio, June 13, 2019)).  Moreover, with respect to
the generic manufacturers’ invocation of Buckman implied preemption, the court
held that the generic manufacturers’ argument “fails for the same reasons Manu-
facturers’ preemption argument fails—namely, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are not
predicated upon violations of the FDA or CSA, nor are they accurately character-
ized as ‘fraud on the FDA’ or ‘fraud on the DEA’ claims.” Id.
66. State ex rel. Stenehjem v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 08-2018-CV-01300,
2019 WL 2245743 (N.D. Dist. Ct. May 10, 2019).
67. Id. at *5.
68. Id. at *7–8.
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tion.69  As such, Purdue did not have a sufficient basis under Wy-
eth’s “clear evidence” standard to change the label.  The court also
relied on the REMS program “blueprint” to support the proposi-
tion that the FDA label incorporated the concept of
pseudoaddiction.70
In contrast, the Ohio federal MDL court was “unable to con-
clude the PROP letter satisfied Wyeth’s clear-evidence standard
[because] . . . the [c]ourt could not rule on the preemptive effect of
the FDA letter in the absence of a full record.”71  The MDL court
explicitly refused to follow the North Dakota decision, which it
characterized as, “by leaps and bounds, an outlier on the question
of preemption.”72  And, in a similar vein, the New York state court
refused to credit the “less-than-definitive determination” concern-
ing PROP’s request for maximum dosage and treatment duration as
meeting the Wyeth clear evidence threshold.73  The court high-
lighted the fact that, in its response to PROP, and in light of the
concerning high rates of addiction, the FDA requested “further ex-
ploration” of the long-term use of opioids, even though at that time
69. Specifically, the court observed that
[i]n 2013, the FDA addressed the same issues raised by the State[ ] and
concluded that no modification to the product labeling was necessary.  In
response to a 2012 citizen’s petition from PROP, the FDA studied the
available scientific evidence and concluded that it supports the use of ER/
LA opioids to treat chronic non-cancer pain.
Id. at *5 (citations omitted).  The court then analyzed the various allegations made
by the State and how they conflicted with statements the FDA has approved and
concluded that the FDA has communicated its disagreement with the State’s spe-
cific contention that Purdue “falsely and misleadingly touted the benefits of long-
term opioid use and falsely and misleadingly suggested that these benefits were
supported by scientific evidence.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); accord Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 855 F.3d 1091, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017).
70. State ex rel. Stenehjem, No. 08-2018-CV-01300, 2019 WL 2245743, at *6.
71. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17 MD 2804, 2019 WL
4178591, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2019).  As mentioned above, moreover, the
court raised an alternative ground to reject preemption: “[E]ven if the Court were
to agree with the argument the FDA letter had some preemptive effect, this would
not preempt every theory of liability articulated by Plaintiffs, e.g., fraudulent mar-
keting and the failure to monitor and prevent opioid diversion.” Id.
72. Id. at *5.  Bolstering its conclusion, the court reasoned that,
[f]irst, Plaintiffs simply have not proposed any label changes.  Second,
there is no evidence the FDA approved or endorsed Manufacturers’ cam-
paign message that the risk of addiction is manageable for patients with a
history of addiction problems, or that signs of opioid addiction are actu-
ally pseudoaddiction ameliorated with more opioids.
Id.
73. In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017, 2018 WL 3115102, at *11 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 18, 2018).
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the petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to support their
specific recommendations.74
B. Agency Reference Model: A Necessary Dialogue between
Courts and the FDA
Courts struggle with articulating a coherent and consistent
framework for analyzing preemption questions—and this is no
doubt true in the context of the opioid litigation discussed above.
In prior work, I have advanced an “agency reference model” for
preemption decision-making, whereby courts would look to input
from the relevant federal regulator in order to evaluate whether the
state tort law clashes or impedes upon federal regulatory risk deci-
sions.75  The model is premised on the idea that tort and regulation
work in tandem, and courts’ preemption decisions provide an op-
portunity for an independent judicial check on regulators’ choices
and views in striking the optimal balance.  Astutely aware of the
potential for ideologically driven decisions on the part of regula-
tors—as well as danger of political flip-flop in successive adminis-
trations—the model purposely calls for courts to “reference” input
from federal regulating agencies, not accord “deference” to them.
Applying “hard look” review, courts should scrutinize the basis for
the agency’s determination to ensure that there is sound empirical
basis for its underlying decisions regarding incompatibility of com-
peting state tort standards.76
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Wyeth decision implicitly embraced
such an “agency reference model.”  In that case, the Court tackled
the issue of whether a manufacturer of an FDA-approved drug
could nonetheless be held liable in tort for failure-to-warn.  The
manufacturer relied on a statement of the FDA, given in a pream-
ble to a regulation governing the content of drug labels, which indi-
cated that the agency’s approval of labeling should preempt
conflicting or contrary state law.77  However, this was a sudden
74. Id.
75. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An
Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008).
76. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing”
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2178–91 (2009) (elaborating upon this framework by
looking to how heightened judicial review of preemptive regulations would oper-
ate in practice); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judi-
cial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589,
1634–46 (2014) (endorsing a system by which agencies’ conflict preemption deter-
minations would be subject to more demanding judicial scrutiny).
77. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009) (citing Requirements on Con-
tent and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Prod-
ucts, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006)).
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change (following a change in political administration) from the
FDA’s long-held position to the contrary.78  The about-face in the
preamble to the regulation—inserted after conclusion of the notice-
and-comment process in which affected entities and interested per-
sons could submit comments and attempt to challenge the findings
of the agency—amounted to a “procedural flaw” in the administra-
tive process.79  The U.S. Supreme Court (unlike the state courts be-
low) did take the administrative record before it seriously—with
citations by the majority and dissent from the nearly 50-year admin-
istrative back-and-forth between the drug manufacturer and the
FDA; moreover, the Court also considered the FDA’s views on pre-
emption.80  However, instead of deferring thereto, the Court ap-
plied a form of “hard look” review to the FDA preamble, which, in
light of the procedural flaw, did not withstand scrutiny.  The major-
ity also noted the fact that the FDA had changed its position, and
its new stance did not emerge out of the appropriate administrative
law notice-and-comment process.81
The Abrecht Court elaborated on Wyeth (particularly the
“clear evidence” standard).82  But questions still persist—many of
which have implications for the agency reference model.
1. Key Unresolved Questions
One unresolved issue in the wake of Albrecht is which types of
agency action trigger preemption.  A second, related, issue is what
is the required mechanism for this dialogue with the FDA, and how
direct must the communication be?  For example, does the FDA’s
rejection of a citizen petition suffice?  Courts are thus far divided
on this particular issue.  Prior to Albrecht, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the rejection of a citizen petition may consti-
tute “clear evidence” that the FDA would have rejected a manufac-
turer-initiated change to a drug label.83  But the New York opioids
court resisted this line of cases, highlighting the fact that manufac-
turers have “superior access to information about their drugs, espe-
cially in the post[-]marketing phase as new risks emerge[.]”84  As a
result, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that the
agency would have rejected manufacturers’ change of label propos-
78. Id. at 578–79, 578 n.10.
79. See id. at 577.
80. See id. at 577–79, 578 nn.10–12.
81. Id. at 580.
82. Merck Sharpe & Dohme, Inc. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1678 (2019).
83. See Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 855 F.3d 1091, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017).
84. In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017, 2018 WL 3115102, at *9 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 18, 2018).
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als meant to strengthen dosing instruction and administration of the
drugs.85
2. Spotlight on Input from the FDA
Given the need for input from the FDA to fuel the agency ref-
erence model, courts will likely want a fairly comprehensive regula-
tory record at their disposal.  This raises a particular issue.  Will
litigants be incentivized to provide such a record (as opposed to the
status quo whereby litigants tend to supply bits and pieces that
serve their respective interests and only in select cases)?  Or should
the agency be called upon to intervene in the litigation and thereby
provide this information to the court along with its interpretive
views?
Indeed, several courts have arrived at a standstill, remarking
upon the absence of a full regulatory record in making what is, in
essence, a fact-bound inquiry regarding the precise decisions made
by the FDA at particular junctures in time.  In opioid litigation,
some of the courts have taken the position that the determination
about whether the FDA condoned the manufacturers’ actions is a
factual inquiry that should not be made at the motion to dismiss
stage.  For example, the New Jersey state court observed that “[t]he
State alleges that Purdue’s marketing was inconsistent with or not
covered by FDA approvals.”86  And the court reasoned, “At this
stage of the litigation, the Court must accept the allegations as true
and give the State all reasonable inferences.”87  The court contin-
ued, “If the State is successful on the merits, Purdue would not be
forced to violate federal law.  Thus, it would be possible for Purdue
to comply with both New Jersey and federal laws.”88  The court thus
rejected Purdue’s preemption argument on the ground that no in-
compatibility between state and federal law had been shown;89 in-
deed, given the fact-bound nature of the question, the absence of
the regulatory record and any input from the FDA made this con-
clusion a virtual certainty.
A New Hampshire state court similarly expressed reservations
about whether “it is proper to take up such a necessarily fact inten-
sive inquiry in a motion to dismiss”90 and refused “at this stage to
85. Id.
86. Grewal v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. ESX-C-245-17, 2018 WL 4829660, at




90. State v. Purdue Pharma Inc., No. 217-2017-CV-00402, 2018 WL 4566129,
at *3 (N.H. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2018).
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comprehensively parse each of the remaining allegations in writ-
ing.”91  Nevertheless, “[h]aving . . . reviewed the complaint and its
many allegations and considered the parties’ voluminous filings rel-
evant to Purdue’s motion and their accompanying exhibits, the
Court conclude[d] Purdue has not shown that the State’s allegations
wholly reflect conduct consistent with FDA approved labeling.”92
Faced with the absence of a sufficient regulatory record—or
perhaps more likely, warring versions of the import of incomplete
pieces of what is in the regulatory record—courts should consider
soliciting the views of the agency.  At various times in recent his-
tory, the FDA took a fairly aggressive stance toward intervening in
private drug litigation, especially in cases before federal courts.93
Moreover, even where the FDA does not intervene on its own,
courts can solicit its views.  Here, the practice of state and federal
courts diverges.  State court judges tend to be less deferential to-
wards federal agencies.  Not only are “federal courts more likely to
defer to federal agencies, but—equally important in terms of ex-
plaining the decision-making process of courts—federal courts are
more likely than state courts to solicit the views of the FDA.”94
Either way, once courts have summoned this key information
before them, they have a significant role to play in terms of judicial
oversight.
3. Judicial “Hard Look” Review
Finally, questions remain regarding the stringency of judicial
review of the input from the agency.  Two high profile cases provide
a backdrop against which we can evaluate how the agency reference
model might play out.
First, in Shuker v. Smith & Nephew,95 a plaintiff was injured by
a “hybrid” device.  A “hybrid” device is a combination of a Class
III device—which requires a full “premarket approval” (“PMA”)
safety review by the FDA—and Class I and II devices—which do
not require full safety review and are approved through a more le-
nient “§ 510(k)” approval.96  The court further described this as an
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id.
93. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Pre-
emption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J. L. & POL’Y
1013, 1020 (2007).
94. Id. at 1020; see also id at 1037 (“On the whole, the FDA is far more active
in the federal courts than in the state courts.”).
95. Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2018).
96. Id. at 768.  According to the court, one of the device components, the “R3
metal liner” was part of the “Birmingham hip resurfacing system [BHR],” which
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off-label use of the PMA component.97  Lower federal courts are
divided on the issue whether preemption analysis should apply to
the “hybrid” device as a whole, or instead, to each of the separate
components.  With respect to the specific matter at hand, there is a
strong safety-based reason to consider preemption as applied to the
“hybrid” device as a whole.  This is especially true given that such a
device was not subjected to the FDA’s rigorous PMA process to
certify its safety and effectiveness.  This case is unlike the situations
faced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr98 and
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,99 where the Court’s textual analysis
pointed to the significance of the stringency (or lack thereof) in the
FDA’s market clearing or regulatory approval process.  With re-
spect to hybrid devices, by contrast, a strict textual analysis points
in one direction (preemption), whereas consideration of the FDA’s
lack of PMA for the device in its entirety points in the opposite
direction (against preemption).
Given the novelty of applying preemption in the context of
such hybrid devices, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Shuker
invited the FDA to file an amicus brief addressing “whether and
how § 360k(a) applies to state tort claims that concern a component
of a device that received premarket approval when used in combi-
nation with components that did not.”100  The FDA endorsed the
position that hybrid devices should be considered component by
component.  The FDA relied on the fact that the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 define “device” as follows: Any “instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro rea-
gent, or other similar or related article, including any component,
part, or accessory, which,” among other things, is “intended to af-
fect the structure or any function of the body.”101  The FDA rea-
soned that, because the definition of “device” includes component
parts, it follows that any component of a PMA device also enjoys
had been granted PMA by the FDA.  Id.  The remaining components were Class II
devices approved through the lenient § 510(k) process. Id.
97. Id. at 772.  The R3 metal liner was approved by the FDA only for use with
the PMA BHR system, and not as part of the § 510(k)-cleared R3 acetabular sys-
tem.  The FDA-approved label for the BHR makes this clear: “[T]he R3 metal
liner is intended for use as part of the BHR system only.”  Amicus Letter of Food
& Drug Admin. at 4, Shucker v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 885 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. Sept.
14, 2017) (No. 16-3785) [hereinafter FDA Amicus Letter].
98. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
99. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
100. FDA Amicus Letter, supra note 97, at 5–6.
101. Id. at 7 (citing 21 USC § 321(h)) (emphasis added).
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§ 360k(a) preemption.  The court subsequently extensively relied
upon the FDA’s Amicus Letter Brief throughout its decision.102
Second, in the recent Roundup litigation, Monsanto argued
before a California federal district court that the plaintiffs’ warning
and design claims were impliedly preempted under Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) because Mon-
santo cannot change Roundup’s label or design without first
obtaining approval from the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”).103  In this way, the EPA’s review may be analogous to the
FDA’s safety review sufficient to establish safety standards that
preempt.  Further, the EPA is now proactively asserting glyphosate
is not a carcinogen,104 presumably making any state law claim re-
quiring a carcinogenicity warning inconsistent with FIFRA
requirements.
In its amicus brief on appeal at the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the EPA conceded that, at the time California enacted more
stringent warnings for glyphosate, the agency approved several pes-
ticide manufacturers’ applications to allow the addition of a cancer
warning to the pesticide labels.105  The EPA’s current position is
102. Though the court noted that courts “‘do not defer to an agency’s view’
concerning preemption . . . such views as presented in amicus curiae are ‘entitled to
respect’ . . . to the extent [they] ha[ve] the ‘power to persuade.’” Shuker, 885 F.3d
at 773 n.11 (quoting Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 693–94
(3d Cir. 2016)).  The court also cited Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the seminal case in
which the Supreme Court laid out “this deferential approach to “the rulings, inter-
pretations and opinions” of the administrative agency overseeing a statute. 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“While not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, [the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the administrator] do consti-
tute a body of experience and informed judgment . . . [with] power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.”).
103. In re Roundup Products Liability Litigation, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1085,
1087–88 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019) (citing inter alia, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555
(2009) (order denying motion for summary judgment)).  In Bates v. Dow Agros-
ciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court outlined the scope of
FIFRA’s express preemption provision with respect to state failure-to-warn claims
and also held that FIFRA did not preempt state claims for defective design and
breach of warranty.  FIFRA’s express preemption of state labeling requirements is
somewhat limited: So long as the warning label would still be “consistent” with the
law’s requirements, the label would not be preempted. Id. at 447.
104. Tom Polansek, U.S. Environment Agency Says Glyphosate Weed Killer Is
Not a Carcinogen, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2019), https://reut.rs/2xoT7Tr [https://
perma.cc/93G6-WMBF].
105. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Monsanto
at 10, Monsanto Co. v. Hardeman, No. 19-16636 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2019).  The EPA
elaborates:
Because this listing triggered Proposition 65’s warning requirements,
many manufacturers that had been registered to use glyphosate reached
out to EPA for guidance.  Some specifically sought EPA’s approval to
amend their product labels to satisfy Proposition 65.  EPA did approve a
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that “[t]hese label-change approvals . . . were erroneous because
the proposed edits warned of a cancer risk that, according to EPA’s
assessment, does not exist.”106  To support its significant change in
position, the EPA relies on an informal communication, namely a
letter to glyphosate registrants written during pendency of the
litigation.107
As a preliminary matter, input from the EPA is relevant to the
court’s preemption decision.  Moreover, it was the EPA’s amicus
brief that supplied the otherwise missing administrative record—
namely reams of citations to the EPA’s approval process for the
pesticide, as well as its prior approval of additions to the labeling.
But, in terms of the EPA’s brief and the agency’s arguments for
preemption, the situation seems remarkably similar to Wyeth v. Le-
vine; there, the U.S. Supreme Court held the plaintiff’s failure-to-
warn claim was not preempted even though the FDA had approved
the drug’s warning label, because the manufacturer could have
sought a change in the label.  In this case, the EPA did approve
several label changes to warn of glyphosate’s carcinogenicity after
California added the chemical as a possible carcinogen subject to
the labeling requirements of Proposition 65.  Monsanto, therefore,
had an uphill battle to argue that it could not have warned of those
risks when the agency has a history of approving pesticide label
changes for this specific chemical and cancer risk.  It is significant
that the EPA has acknowledged its prior record on the chemical
and indeed supplied the information as part of the administrative
record before the court.
The EPA, moreover, is currently undertaking a revision to re-
gistration requirements for glyphosate, a process that allows for
public comment and assessment of whether the labeling require-
ments are consistent with FIFRA’s mandate to protect public
health and the environment.108
limited number of applications allowing the addition of a Proposition 65
glyphosate cancer warning to pesticide labels when requested.
Id.
106. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 11 (“In an August 7, 2019 letter, EPA informed all glyphosate reg-
istrants that EPA had concluded glyphosate is ‘not likely to be carcinogenic to
humans.’”).  According to the EPA, it “then stated that products bearing a Pro-
position 65 warning statement due to the presence of glyphosate are misbranded
under FIFRA because such a statement is ‘false and misleading.’” Id.  Perhaps in
an effort to provide a pivotal point that predates the litigation, the EPA explains
that in a 2019 letter citing to a scientific review from 2017, the agency concluded
that glyphosate was not carcinogenic. Id.
108. Glyphosate Proposed Interim Registration Review Decision; Notice of
Availability, 84 Fed. Reg. 19,782 (May 6, 2019).  NRDC filed comments laying out
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Under the agency reference model, applying heightened scru-
tiny to the agency’s views on implied preemption, the court should
give little weight to the EPA’s views for two reasons.  First, the
agency has changed its position without providing sufficient empiri-
cal evidence to support a reasoned basis for its newly adopted view.
And even more significantly, there is an ongoing process for the
EPA revisions to the registrations requirements for glyphosate.
The preemption context provides an avenue for a kind of indirect
challenge to the agency’s registration decision; but because the di-
rect administrative law process is underway, it would make sense
for the court to hold off, pending the conclusion of the administra-
tive process, perhaps via the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.109
CONCLUSION: ACCOUNTABILITY LOOPHOLE
The FDA has, thus far, been largely missing in action through-
out the opioid litigation.  Yet, at the same time, it has played a ma-
jor role in pre-market review and post-market surveillance of
prescription opioids.  Even those who are hostile to federal pre-
emption defenses and/or champion any move that makes it more
likely drug manufacturers will be held liable for state tort actions
should be concerned by this state of affairs.  When courts summa-
rily dismiss (or ignore altogether) the manufacturers’ preemption
arguments, they forfeit an opportunity to hold the FDA accounta-
ble.  If, instead, courts applied the agency reference model to (1)
require the agency to set forth and justify its regulatory actions and
(2) subject the input received from the agency to heightened judi-
cial review, the FDA could no longer sit silent on the sidelines.  The
FDA is off the hook for the time being as it remains in the periph-
ery of the raging debate regarding responsibility for the opioid cri-
the disagreements within the agency about whether the December 2017 assessment
was done correctly. See NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, Comments from the Natural
Resources Defense Council: Glyphosate Proposed Interim Registration Review De-
cision, 3–4 (Sept. 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/3an6WQW [https://perma.cc/G8CZ-M3E2].
I am grateful to Rachel Rothschild (NYU Law 2020) for bringing this to my
attention.
109. For elaboration of primary jurisdiction, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-
Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW
359, 383–84 (2014).
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court may “refer a matter
extending beyond the ‘conventional experiences of judges’ or ‘falling
within the realm of administrative discretion’ to an administrative agency
with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight.’” . . . . The effect
is that “the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its views.”
Id. (quoting Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n Inc. v. AT&T Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222–23 (2d Cir.
1995).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-3\DIK304.txt unknown Seq: 26 21-MAY-20 16:18
694 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:669
sis.  To date, only bits and pieces of the FDA’s prescription opioid
regulatory history has been considered by the courts.  The time has
come for courts to close the accountability loophole and call upon
the FDA to speak.
